one domicile at a time, 9 occasionally, as in the Howard Hughes case, more than one state claims that the deceased was domiciled within its borders. 1 0 Unlike situs, however, use of the state common law concept of domicile for the purpose of determining jurisdiction to levy an estate tax is considered unreviewable in either the lower federal courts or the United States Supreme Court. 1 1 There are no established constitutional" bars to protect the intangible estate from multiple taxation. The estate must pay each state its claimed tax. 3 Justice Powell recently argued that the multiple taxation of an estate by more than one state on the basis of domicile violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 4 This Note suggests that, although Justice Powell's specific suggestion as to how the due process analysis could be used to provide a remedy is not feasible, the due process limits on state power in the corporate taxation area offer a persuasive analogy for the recognition of due process limits on state power to tax intangible estates. 1 5 Once these principles are recognized, estate administrators would be able to seek a remedy in the Supreme Court to review the judgments rendered by state courts. The application of these due process limits on state power The Yale Law Journal Vol. 94: 1229, 1985 to tax intangibles would add a coherence sorely lacking in the due process analysis currently used in state estate taxation.
I. THE FAILURE OF AN ANALOGY: DUE PROCESS LIMITS BREAK DOWN
The series of cases prior to 1942 which established due process limits on estate taxation of real estate, tangibles, and intangibles were based on a somewhat mechanical extension of the ancient doctrine of situs. 1 6 In 1942 the Supreme Court found that the logic behind the doctrine of situs, so far removed from its original field of application, could not justify similar due process limits on intangible property. 17 Ending twelve years of confusion and indecision," the Court declared in State Tax Comm'n v. Aldrich that because the estate tax is a tax on the transfer of property from the dead to the living, any state which facilitates that transfer has a taxable 16 . See supra notes 3, 4, 5 & 7 which trace the evolution of due process limits on real and tangible property alongside the distinctions the Court has drawn regarding intangibles.
17. State Tax Comm'n v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174 (1942) . 18. Prior to 1929, there was no prohibition on the multiple taxation of intangibles, Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U.S. 189 (1903) . Succession was a privilege granted, and therefore taxable, by the state of domicile and any other state whose laws facilitated the succession. Id. at 204-05. However, as intangible property became more important, and tangible property was granted the same immunity from multiple taxation as real property, Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U.S. 473, 488-92 (1925) , the Court felt compelled to overrule Blackstone and grant intangible property a similar immunity from multiple taxation despite the lack of an ascertainable situs. In Farmers Loan Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U.S. 204 (1930) , the Court held that state bonds and municipal certificates of indebtedness were taxable only by the state of domicile, declaring that:
We have determined that in general intangibles may be properly taxed at the domicile of their owner and we can find no sufficient reason for saying that they are not entitled to enjoy an immunity against taxation at more than one place similar to that accorded to tangibles. The difference between the two things, although obvious enough, seems insufficient to justify the harsh and oppressive discrimination against intangibles .... Id. at 212. A rapid succession of cases followed, extending immunity from multiple taxation to other forms of intangible property: Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U.S. 586 (1930) (bank deposits, promissory notes and bonds); Beidler v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 282 U.S. 1 (1930) (indebtedness for advances and unpaid dividends); First Nat'l Bank v. Maine, 284 U.S. 312 (1932) (corporate stock).
Within a few years, however, the Court began its retreat from the Farmers Loan position. Graves v. Elliott, 307 U.S. 383 (1939) (permitting taxation of trust property by both state of domicile and state of administration); Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357 (1939) (same). In 1942, the Court returned to its original rule, permitting states to levy taxes on the basis of different benefits conferred, stating:
[E]ven though we believed that a different system should be designed to protect against multiple taxation, it is not our province to provide it . . . . To do so would be to indulge in the dangerous assumption that the Fourteenth Amendment was "intended to give us carte blanche to embody our economic or moral beliefs in its prohibitions. eliminated the problem of multiple taxation caused by the differing benefits which states may confer upon the succession of intangible estates. 26 The problem of multiple findings of domicile, however, remains unaddressed and unsolved. As Justice Powell recently declared, it seems inherently illogical to uphold multiple taxation on the basis of domicile when each of the claiming states would agree that only the state of domicile may levy an estate tax and that a person may have only one domicile at the time of death. 27 Since a person may have only one domicile at a time, one of the states levying the estate tax necessarily lacks domicile. The state that lacks domicile lacks the nexus required by the due process clause. The same state has also levied the tax without the authority of its own state law. Such a violation of state law, in and of itself, constitutes a due process violation. 9 The difficulty with this reasoning is that it presumes not only that the disputing states agree that a person may have only one domicile at a time and that only the state of domicile may levy a tax," 0 but also that each of the states has defined domicile in precisely the same way in its case law and has given the exact same evidentiary weight to the various factors and 85, 92 (1982) . In his dissent from the latter opinion, Justice Powell again stressed his concern that there be a federal solution to a federal problem: "Thus, at least in a case such as this, in which the very controversy is the result of our federal system, I continue to believe that resort to federal interpleader is not proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment as construed by 4 If the Texas court hands down a judgment without California as a party to the litigation, that judgment will not necessarily be res judicata in any subsequent suits brought in California courts. 5 Whenever a judgment of a state court is asserted to be res judicata in another state court's proceeding, the adjudicative jurisdiction of the rendering court is subject to inquiry; if it appears that the rendering court did not have adjudicative jurisdiction, its judgment is not entitled to full faith and credit. 3 6 In the area of estate taxation, only the state in which the decedent was domiciled has adjudicative jurisdiction.
3 7 Therefore, California may simply ignore the Texas judgment by declaring that the decedent was domiciled in California, not Texas, and that the Texas court did not have jurisdiction to render a judgment. Texas may, of course, do the same if suit is originally brought in a California state court. Only if one state is willing to appear and be bound by the decision of the opposing state will the resulting judgment protect the estate from double taxation. Not surprisingly, states have often been unwilling to waive their sovereign immunity in another state's court, particularly when the disputed estate taxes involve a large sum of money. 3 court's inability to assert jurisdiction over New York taxing authorities to prevent double escheat of intangible property threatened due process violation). In reaching its holding, the Court declared: "It is plain that Pennsylvania courts, with no power to bring other States before them, cannot give such hearings." Id. at 80. See also Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934). The Court explained:
Manifestly, we cannot rest with a mere literal application of the words of § 2 of Article III, or assume that the letter of the Eleventh Amendment exhausts the restrictions upon suits against non-consenting States. Behind the words of the constitutional provisions are postulates which limit and control ....
There is also the postulate that States of the Union, still possessing attributes of sovereignty, shall be immune from suits, without their consent ....
Id. at 322. After the decision in Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979), discussed infra note 34, states may no longer possess such absolute immunity in other states' courts.
34. See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979) (state sovereign immunity in other states' courts is not grounded in or compelled by the Constitution, but rather is a matter of comity between states). Justice Blackmun's dissent in Hall does suggest, though, that on the basis of a disclaimer in footnote 24 of the majority opinion, the holding should be limited to those circumstances where the state official has crossed over state borders and entered into the territory of another sovereign state. Thus in Hall, the Nevada state official lost his immunity because he had entered California territory. 440 U.S. at 428-32 (Blackmun, J., joined by Burger, C.J., & Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Despite the majority's broad holding in Hall, states probably will still feel compelled to grant other states sovereign immunity in their state courts, if only as a matter of comity.
35. 
B. The Inadequacies of Lower Federal Court Remedies
Federal courts do not have jurisdiction to resolve the multiple domicile question either. There is neither federal question jurisdiction, since domicile is a state law concept, nor diversity jurisdiction, since states cannot be citizens of themselves for the purpose of diversity. 9 Additionally, the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against states in a federal court. 4 The Federal Interpleader Act of 193641 was enacted in part to remedy the adjudicative gap caused by the federal courts' limited jurisdiction. A federal question is no longer needed to bring a suit in a federal court if the adverse parties are diverse. Shortly after passage of the Act, in Worcestor County v. Riley, 2 estate administrators sought to interplead the state taxing officials of Massachusetts and California to determine where the decedent had been domiciled. The Court found, however, that even though a federal question was no longer needed to bring the suit in federal court, the suit was still one forbidden by the Eleventh Amendment. 4 " The administrators had tried to bring their case within the scope of the Ex parte Young doctrine, 44 arguing that the levy of the same estate tax by two states violated the due process clause. The suit, therefore, was not against the state but against the state taxing officials to prevent an unconstitutional extension of state power. The administrators argued that since the parties in interest-the state officials-were citizens of states for diversity purposes, the suit fell within the federal court's diversity jurisdiction. 4 Tex. 1979) . Reasoning that therefore the real parties at interest were the states, and that states cannot be citizens of themselves for the purposes of diversity, the judge dismissed the interpleader action as lacking diversity. Id. at 8. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed. After discussing the extensive history of the Interpleader Act and the congressional intent that it be a flexible tool of equity, Lummis v. White, 629 F.2d 397, 399-400 (5th Cir. 1980), the court attempted to explain how Edelman v. Jordan had overruled, sub silentio, Worcester County. The court of appeals reasoned that the remedy sought was not one which would have imposed a liability to be paid from public funds in the state treasury. Rather, it was a remedy which would have had "fiscal consequences to state treasuries . . . [only as] the necessary result of compliance with decrees which by their terms [are] prospective in nature." Id. at 401 (quoting Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. at 667-68). The administrators were not, the court reasoned, suing for funds from the state treasury, but rather were seeking to prevent a future collection of money. And even then, the administrators sought not so much to prevent the collection of money as to obtain a single determination of domicile. Thus, the effect on the state treasury could be seen as ancillary to the remedy sought. Under this interpretation, the suit would not be barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Id. at 402. Since the states were still the real parties in interest, however, the court of appeals was still forced to engage in some fairly elaborate and unorthodox jurisdictional gymnastics to find that the parties did satisfy the diversity requirements necessary to file an interpleader action in a federal court. The court found diversity by assuming that an interested stakeholder may be considered for purposes of establishing diversity under 28 U.S.C. § 1335. Id. at 403. Since it had already been conceded that the acting county treasurer of Los Angeles County was a citizen of California for diversity purposes, id. at 402, there was diversity between two adverse parties-the interested Nevada stakeholder and the California treasurer. Id. at own suggestion, instead holding that Edelman had not so narrowed the scope of the Eleventh Amendment. 5 " The Court emphasized that the Eleventh Amendment gives way only when state officers "are alleged to be acting contrary to federal law or against the authority of state law." 51 Since neither violation had been alleged, Worcestor County v. Riley was still a valid and controlling precedent. 52
C. The Supreme Court Remedy-Available Only at the Court's Discretion
The only potential remedy for the dilemma caused by the multiple taxation of intangibles is for one state to sue the other state under the United States Supreme Court's original jurisdiction. 53 Yet this remedy is tenuous. There must be a controversy between the states. As long as all the claiming states may collect the taxes levied, however, there is no dispute between the states. 54 Only in the rare instance that there is not enough money in the estate to pay all the claimed taxes will the claiming states have a monetary interest in the litigation and become real parties in interest. The Supreme Court will then have jurisdiction over the controversy, but that jurisdiction is discretionary. The Supreme Court may refuse to hear the dispute. Today the chances of an estate actually being exhausted are especially slim. An increasing number of states, including California, levy only a "pick-up tax," that takes advantage of the credit for state estate taxes provided by I.R.C. § 2011 (1984 The requirement of ripeness poses an additional obstacle: Until all the claiming states have rendered final judgments that the decedent was domiciled within each of their respective borders at the time of death, assessed the taxes owed, and found the assets of the estate inadequate to pay the taxes, the claim may be too speculative to be heard by the Supreme Court.
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In summary, both state and lower federal courts lack the power to provide adequate remedies for the problem of multiple taxation on the basis of domicile. State courts have no power to assert jurisdiction over other states or to render judgments enforceable in other state courts. The Eleventh Amendment expressly prohibits federal courts from hearing suits brought against sovereign states. Even the remedy which the Supreme Court may provide is inadequate-only rarely do the preconditions necessary to seek adjudication under the Court's original jurisdiction occur. One must look elsewhere to address the multiple taxation problem caused by multiple findings of domicile.
III. MOVING TOWARD A NEW DUE PROCESS ANALYSIS
Despite its uneasiness with multiple taxation of intangible estates, the Aldrich Court feared to do "violence to the words 'due process' by drawing lines where the Fourteenth Amendment fails to draw them."" 5 The Aldrich Court realized that the attempt to impose due process limits on intangible estates by analogy to real and tangible estates was not only anachronistic and unworkable, but also insensitive to basic federalism concerns. As one dissenting Justice noted, although due process requires that states possess a nexus that justifies the exercise of taxation powers, due process does not define what that nexus should be. 58 Only twice has the taxing nexus been so obvious that the Court has declared that only that one nexus and no other nexus could be a permissible one: Only the state that physically protects real estate renders a taxable benefit. Other benefits a state might confer upon real estate are deemed insubstantial, if not illusory. 59 The same applies to tangible property. 6 The taxation of real estate and chattels, however, is an exception to the norm of allowing the states to specify the taxable benefit. 61 As other areas of law indicate, the due process clause does not mandate specific contacts. It requires only that there be a rational connection between the state and the activity governed that justifies the exercise of state sovereign power. 62 Nonetheless, even though the Court has found that due process does not require one particular nexus in the taxation of intangible estates as it does in the taxation of real and tangible estates," there are due process limits on taxation which the Court has failed to acknowledge in its most recent estate taxation cases. 6 The Court has not followed its own lead: In the choice of law and adjudicative jurisdiction areas, the Court has brought about an almost complete restructuring of due process analysis. The move has been one away from the old doctrines that had effectively determined state law to analyses that look to whether the assertion of state power is justified by certain minimum contacts or connections. 65 Moreover, underlying much of the evolving due process doctrine is a more focused sensitiv-60. Id. 61. Bittker, supra note 4, argues persuasively that the Constitution should not specify the benefit conferred for tangible property either. Comparing tangibles to intangibles, Bittker finds that those benefits conferred by states upon tangibles cannot any more easily be allocated to one state than can benefits conferred upon intangibles. Moreover, while the rule of situs for real property may be too deeply rooted in common law simply to overrule, and the rationale given in Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357 (1939), that only the state of situs can render a meaningful benefit, really does hold, the same is not true for tangibles. As with intangibles, the due process clause should not be read to preclude taxation of tangible property by more than one state.
62. The due process clause requires "minimal contacts" before a state court can assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant. principles of federalism, and in recognition of the imperative need of a State to administer its own fiscal operations." 1 The original attempts to use the due process clause to prevent the multiple taxation of estates did not take a balanced approach towards the sovereign rights of both the state and federal governments. Rather, by requiring a specific nexus, the Court effectively dictated state law. Yet in overruling the constitutional requirement of domicile, the Aldrich Court went too far to accommodate state powers. States' rights need not be unlimited. The due process analysis which has developed in the corporate tax area suggests an alternative, more balanced approach.
IV. DUE PROCESS LIMITS ON STATE CORPORATE INCOME TAXATION SHOULD BE APPLIED TO STATE ESTATE TAXATION
In the corporate tax area, due process requires first that the levying state confer a benefit that justifies the tax levied, and second that the tax be rationally related to taxing values within the state. The latter requirement reflects an implicit bar against double taxation.
A. Due Process Does Not Permit the Abuse of a Nexus
Just as the Supreme Court has refused to mandate the basis on which a state may levy an estate tax on intangibles," 2 the Supreme Court has refused to mandate the basis on which a state may levy a corporate income Finally, we note that the reasons supporting federal non-interference are just as compelling today as they were in in 1937. If federal injunctive relief were available, "state tax administration might be thrown into disarray, and taxpayers might escape the ordinary procedural requirements imposed by state law. During the pendency of the federal suit the collection of revenue under the challenged law might be obstructed, with consequent damage to the State's budget, and perhaps a shift to the State of the risk of taxpayer insolvency." Id. at 527 (quoting Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 128 n.17 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). Of the recent cases construing the scope of the Tax Injunction Act, Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n. v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100 (1981), announces most strongly the federalism and state sovereignty arguments barring federal court intervention in the state tax area. Indeed, the opinion looks beyond the Tax Injunction Act to general federalism and comity restraints:
"The scrupulous regard for the rightful independence of state governments which should at all times actuate the federal courts, and a proper reluctance to interfere by injunction with their fiscal operations, require that such relief should be denied in every case where the asserted federal right may be preserved The Constitution is not a formulary. It does not demand of states strict observance of rigid categories nor precision of technical phrasing in their exercise of the most basic power of government, that of taxation .... A state is free to pursue its own fiscal policies, unembarrassed by the Constitution, if by practical operation of a tax the state has exerted its powers in relation to opportunities which it has given, to protection which it has afforded, to benefits which it has conferred by the fact of being an orderly, civilized society. 75. There are two types of corporate income taxes: (1) excise taxes on doing business or owning property within the state and (2) taxes on net income derived from or attributable to business within the state. J. HELLERSTEIN, supra note 67, at 263-64. The latter type of tax, the corporate income tax, is levied by states in two different ways. If a business is entirely intra-state or the income flowing in from a business is clearly allocable to business within the state, the state taxing authorities will usually use a separate accounting basis to tax corporate income. "Separate accounting is a technique of carving out of the overall business of the taxpayer the activities taking place, the property employed in, and the income derived from, sources within a single State .. Even though the due process clause does not mandate the use of a particular nexus, neither does it permit the abuse of a nexus. The nexus ensures that there is some minimal connection between the business activity taxed and the state. 8 ' The state cannot arbitrarily define the nexus and thereby rob the nexus of its constitutional function. A state may not, for example, declare that it is using the unitary business principle to determine what parts of the corporate income shall form the base to be apportioned, and then include all of a corporation's income, including nonunitary income, as part of the unitary business income. 82 A similar analysis fits easily within the estate taxation context, and would provide both coherence and fairness. Due process does not mandate that a state levy an estate tax only on the basis of domicile, but once a state has declared that its nexus is domicile, it may not then simply define domicile in such a way as to enable itself to tax estates regardless of actual domicile-regardless of the professed nexus. Due process should not permit states to overreach by claiming domicile when the decedent was not domiciled within the state at the time of death.
Adopting this approach would not require the Supreme Court to set forth its own definition of domicile. In the area of corporate taxation, the Court has not set forth its own definition of what constitutes a unitary business. 83 Rather, when a corporation has made a colorable claim that the state's definition of a unitary business effectively renders the concept a nullity, the Court conducts a case-by-case review. 84 J., joined by Marshall & Stevens, JJ., dissenting), seeking adjudication in a federal district court would be highly problematic. Even though there are federal questions at stake, the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982), denies the federal district courts jurisdiction to restrain a state tax in all but the exceptional case when there is no other remedy available. The Tax Injunction Act has kept all of the corporate income tax cases out of federal district courts and would probably do the same for estate taxation cases. Ironically, when there is no federal question, the Tax Injunction Act would not bar an interpleader action in a federal district court since no other remedy is available. The Eleventh Amendment, however, bars such a suit. One can circumvent the Eleventh Amendment only by alleging a constitutional violation, but once one has alleged a constitutional violation there is a federal question giving rise to Supreme Court review. Once Supreme Court review is available, the Tax Injunction Act applies, and bars an interpleader action.
88. Supreme Court review would also enable estate administrators to raise another, perhaps more classic, due process violation. Where the state has found domicile without the authority of state law and inconsistently with past state precedent, the Court may strike down that finding of domicile and declare that it will not allow the adequate state grounds doctrine to nullify due process limits. 
B. Apportionment-The Implicit Bar Against Double Taxation
Beyond the requirement that there be a nexus, due process mandates that "the income attributed to the State for tax purposes must be rationally related to 'values connected with the taxing state."" States sometimes use a separate accounting method to measure the income a corporation generates within its borders. Separate accounting fulfills the due process rational relationship requirement by taxing only the income generated within the state." 4 States also use the unitary business tax method. Because the unitary business principle allows several states to levy a tax on the same income, states use an apportionment formula to ensure that the tax is rationally related to income generated within the state. 95 The Court, however, has repeatedly refused to inject itself into the debate as to which apportionment formulas are the most accurate and most fair ways to tax corporate income. 9 6 As long as the formula of apportionment which the state chooses is "rationally related" to the values being taxed, states may use any formula they wish. Thus the Court has approved the use of a world-wide unitary business formula with three factors for apportionment, 97 a one factor formula to apportion income earned only within the United States, 9 8 and also a three factor formula apportioning United States income. 99 There may be some overlap between the taxes which results in the slight overtaxation of a corporation which does business in several states, but such inaccuracies are considered an inevitable result of the uncertainties of measuring such a tax, and not worthy of judicial intervention. ' Yet due process is not infinitely elastic. Once the state has properly defined the nexus, the formula that the state uses to levy on the basis of that nexus must be both fair and rationally related to taxing values within the state.' 0 ' In evaluating one state's corporate taxation statutes, the Court declared: "The first, and again obvious, component of fairness in an apportionment formula is what might be called internal consistency-that is the formula must be such that, if applied by every jurisdiction, it would result in no more than all of the unitary business's income being taxed."' 2 A state's corporate income tax formula may not result in an inevitable overtaxation. For instance, a formula whereby a state apportions all of the corporation's sales revenue, wherever earned, to itself, violates due process. 103 If the formula were applied by every jurisdiction, and the corporation did business in five states, the other four states would also apportion all of the sales revenue to themselves, and the corporation would be taxed on 500% of its unitary business's sales revenue. Extreme overtaxation, akin to double taxation, violates the due process requirement of fairness.
Stemming from the same concern that the tax be rationally related to income earned within a state, the Court then declared: "The second and more difficult requirement is what might be called external consistency-the factor or factors used in the apportionment formula must actually reflect a reasonable sense of how income is generated."' 4 A taxpayer challenging a state's corporate income tax formula bears the burden of proving "by clear and cogent evidence"' 0 5 that the apportionment formula attributes to the state an amount of income that is 'out of all appropriate proportion to the business transacted . . . in that State."' 0 6 Should the taxpayer bear that burden, the Supreme Court will strike down the apportionment formula. In one early unitary business tax case, the Court struck down a formula because it attributed more than twice the income shown as being generated in the state, to that one state.1 0 7
Fairness under the due process clause prohibits gross overtaxation both by one state alone-one state alone may not double its tax by doubling the income attributable to itself-and by several states jointly. Thus, while due process does not bar double taxation on the basis of differing benefits conferred to a single estate, it does bar double taxation or extreme overtaxation on the basis of the same benefit conferred.
Transplanted to the context of estate taxation, this standard of fairness forbids the gross overtaxation of an estate, whether by one state alone or by several states jointly. In the Howard Hughes case, each state's formula attributed 100% of the estate to each state, resulting in an inevitable taxation of 200% of the estate rather than just 100%.
Admittedly, corporations have been hard pressed to show such dramatic overtaxation when they have challenged the state apportionment formulas.' 0 8 Such gross overtaxation, however, usually arises from the failure to split taxes, rather than from grossly distorted factor weighting. When states levy estate taxes the assumption is that since only one state will levy the tax there is no need to apportion the income. The same assumption underlies the separate accounting-method for the corporate income tax. The state levies a tax only on income generated within the state. 109 When, however, more than one state levies a tax on the same income, as is the case with the unitary business tax, the state must then avoid overtaxation by apportioning the income." 0 Hence, whenever more than one state has found that the decedent was domiciled within its borders, and each state has done so within the confines of its state laws and within the confines of the due process analysis, the Supreme Court should intervene to remedy this extraordinary situation. Due process demands that a tax be rationally related to the values being taxed, and double taxation of an intangible estate both violates the rational relation and fairness required by due process. The Court has several options: It could apportion the tax itself; or it could induce the states to split the taxes owed, as it did in the recent California v. Texas dispute."' The Court could also make a single and binding determination of 108. Container Corp., 103 S. Ct. at 2949-50. 109. See J. HELLERSTEIN, supra note 67, at 323-27. 110. See supra note 95. 111. The Court could also set forth an apportionment formula. There are two basic problems, however, with such an approach. The first is that such a formula might in effect dictate to states what factors should be used to determine domicile and how those factors should be weighed. The Court may prefer to refrain from such interference with state law. Second, it is not clear what sort of apportionment formula the Court could set forth. One possibility would be to allocate intangible property according to the tangible or real property located within the claiming states. But such an allocation seems both nonsensical and arbitrary. The amount of land that the deceased may have owned within a state bears no relationship to the benefits conferred upon the succession of intangible property. Another possibility would be to allocate according to the degree of connection the deceased had with the claiming states. The Court could look to factors such as length of residence, taxes paid, driver's license, voting records, local community activities, and other indicators of domiciliary intent. Yet such an inquiry involves such extensive fact-finding that the Court would actually make its decisions on an ad hoc basis, rather than on the basis of a formulary apportionment. domicile, allowing only one state to levy the tax. If the claiming states have made legitimate findings of domicile under both their own state laws and under the due process federal floor, however, it would be fairest to encourage a settlement between the states, as was done in the Howard Hughes case.
CONCLUSION
The history of property and estate taxation is "hardly one of settled consistency. ' 11 2 Rather, it is a history that has created a constitutional due process analysis which is both distorted by anachronisms and at times grossly unfair. The Court should overrule Worcestor County v. Riley and recognize that the established due process limits on state power in the -corporate income tax area are equally applicable in the area of estate taxation. The states would retain their sovereign taxing powers and still have the discretion to choose how to levy their taxes. Their taxing machinery would remain undisturbed. Only in the case of extreme distortion of nexus, or in the extraordinary case where the determination of a decedent's domicile is truly difficult, need there be any Supreme Court intervention. The remedy will no longer depend on a double contingency giving rise to a dispute under the Court's original jurisdiction.
-Kathleen Leslie Roin
112. Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85, 97 n.6 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting).
